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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article is about children, the decision by a custodial 
parent with sole physical custody of a minor child or children to 
relocate in another state following divorce, and Minnesota’s 
response to the relocation request.  It compares Minnesota’s 
relocation doctrine with that of several other jurisdictions and 
examines the competing views of experts on the impact relocation 
has on children.  The article discusses Minnesota’s relocation 
history, its use of presumptions, and constitutional issues involving 
relocation.  It also touches upon other factors that impact 
relocation such as gender politics and significant social changes 
that have occurred during the last quarter century.  Finally, the 
article concludes with the suggestion that the impact of recent 
social changes, doctrinal confusion among courts throughout the 
nation, and disagreement among experts are so compelling that 
Minnesota’s Legislature should review the relocation issue. 
It is old news that the American family is having difficulty.  Of 
greatest concern are the children and the possible detrimental 
impact recent social changes have had on them.  These changes, 
 
 †  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. 
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including no-fault divorce and the lack of stigma attached to having 
children outside of marriage, have generated huge numbers of 
broken homes, driven both parents in large numbers to find work 
at jobs outside the home, and encouraged single-motherhood. 
Today’s family problems have attracted considerable attention 
from legislatures, Congress, courts, politicians and others.  Former 
President Bill Clinton, for example, evinced concern over the 
potential harmful impact that fatherless families have on children.  
In a 1995 speech, Mr. Clinton said: 
The single biggest social problem in our society may be 
the growing absence of fathers from their children’s 
homes, because it contributes to so many other social 
problems . . . .  Without a father to help guide, without a 
father to care, without a father to teach boys to be men 
and to teach girls to expect respect from men, it’s harder.1 
Statistical evidence supports Mr. Clinton’s concern; America is 
increasingly becoming a fatherless society.2  Estimates suggest that 
40% of all children in the United States resided in fatherless homes 
in 1995, and “it is predicted that more than one-half of all children 
in America will spend a ‘significant’ part of their childhood living 
apart from their fathers.”3 
America is also increasingly becoming a nation where children 
in two-parent families see less and less of their parents because 
both parents must work outside the home to maintain a reasonable 
standard of living.  It is estimated that in 1998 only 68% of 
American children lived with two parents4 and, of those parents, 
about 31% were both working full-time outside the home.5  This is 
up from 17% working outside the home in 1980.6 
Data gathered in 1997 regarding children living with single 
mothers, often struggling to make ends meet, shows that these 
 
 1. President Bill Clinton, Speech at the University of Texas, Austin (Oct. 16, 
1995), available at http://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/EOP/OP/html/ 
ut.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2001). 
 2. Lynn D. Wardle, Relationships Between Family and Government, 31 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 13 (2000). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Pamela K. Graham, Note, Parental Responsibility Laws: Let the Punishment Fit 
the Crime, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2000) (citing FEDERAL INTERAGENCY 
FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA’S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL 
INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 7, 14 (1999)). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1723-24. 
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mothers are working outside the home about 41% of the time.7 
The emancipation of women and their movement toward full 
equality has also impacted children as married women are 
increasingly drawn into the outside-the-home workforce.  Estimates 
are that participation of married women in the labor force doubled 
from 1969 to 1998.8  For married women with children less than 
three years of age, the increase in the workforce over this period 
“was almost threefold.”9  With both parents working outside the 
home, children often have more daily contact with strangers than 
their parents. 
Divorced mothers with children and those with children born 
out-of-wedlock share a grim statistical reality: they will find it 
extremely difficult to avoid poverty.  The one-parent family is six 
times more likely to be poor than the two-parent family.10  In 1994, 
it is estimated that 35% of children under the age of six living with 
only their mother were at less than 50% of the poverty threshold; 
however, only 4% of those living with both parents were that poor.11  
In that same year, 60% of children under the age of six living with 
only their mothers were at or below the poverty line, whereas only 
13% of those living with both parents fell into this category.12 
There is significant value to children if there are two parents 
raising them.  It is claimed, for example, that the “number of 
parents living with a child is usually correlative to the amount and 
quality of human and economic resources available to that child.”13  
It is also claimed that the family conditions with respect to divorce 
and family cohesiveness are listed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation as factors “known to affect the volume and type of 
[juvenile] crime occurring from place to place.”14 
The law surrounding the issue of post-divorce relocation and 
its impact on children is only one of many family problems society 
is facing.  However, because relocation may place a natural distance 
 
 7. Id. at 1724. 
 8. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, 
Women’s Cultural Caregiving and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 374 n.11 (2000). 
 9. Id. at n.12. 
 10. Wardle, supra note 2, at 11 (citing Kenneth F. Boehm, The Legal Services 
Program: Unaccountable, Political, Anti-Poor, Beyond Reform and Unnecessary, 17 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 321, 354-55 (1998)). 
 11. Id. at 11 n.61. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Graham, supra note 4, at 1724. 
 14. Id. (alteration in original). 
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barrier between the child and the non-custodial parent, it is an 
issue to be seriously weighed and resolved.  Is Minnesota’s liberal 
relocation doctrine “really” serving a child’s best interests?  Or, is 
the present state of the law in need of serious repair?  While there 
is wide-spread disagreement over the answers to those questions, all 
agree that relocation is among the most difficult of the family 
problems to resolve.15 
II.  GENDER POLITICS AND A CHANGING SOCIETY 
Gender politics have played a role in custody legislation for 
decades.  For example, the nineteenth century paternal 
preference, which awarded a minor child to the father absent a 
showing he was unfit, was biased against women.16  This preference 
was followed in most jurisdictions in the twentieth century by the 
maternal, or tender years, preference, which awarded custody of a 
child of tender years to its mother, absent a showing she was unfit.  
This presumption was biased against men.  At one time, the 
Minnesota Legislature suggested that courts match the gender of 
the minor child involved in a custody dispute to that of the 
divorcing parent.17  Such statutes were biased against both men and 
women.18 
In recent years, gender-driven political organizations have 
been vocal in their claims of gender bias.  One fathers’ rights 
group, for example, claims that: 
It is a well documented fact that fathers have a very 
difficult time obtaining custody due to the pervasive 
gender-bias that still exists in many parts of the Family 
Court system.  The sad fact is that custody is frequently 
granted without any regard to who is actually the better 
 
 15. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: 
Redefining Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM. 
L.Q. 607, 628-30 (2001) (discussing the difficulties courts face in relocation cases). 
 16. See Flint v. Flint, 63 Minn. 187, 189-90, 65 N.W 272, 273 (1895). 
 17. In Minnesota, it was thought that older boys were better raised by their 
fathers; girls, especially infants, were believed better raised by their mothers.  From 
1969 to 1974, Minnesota courts were not prevented from considering a child’s age 
and sex, and those of the prospective parent, when making custody decisions.  In 
1974, the Minnesota Legislature removed the language from the statute.  Act of 
March 28, 1974, ch. 330, § 2, 1974 Minn. Laws 555, 555-56 (1974) (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000)). 
 18. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child 
Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 615-29 (1992) (discussing history and effect of gender 
bias on child custody determinations). 
4
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parent and what is truly best for the children.19 
The American Coalition for Fathers and Children declares 
that it exists to create “a family law system, legislative system, and 
public awareness which promotes equal rights for ALL parties 
affected by divorce, and the breakup of a family or establishment of 
paternity.”20 
Women’s political groups are just as vocal in expressing their 
concerns—especially their rights, the fathers’ rights movement, 
and biased legislation.21  For example, the president of the 
Michigan National Organization of Women expressed serious 
concern over the national agenda of fathers’ rights groups: 
Forced joint custody is . . . a top legislative priority of 
fringe fathers’ rights groups nationwide.  These groups 
argue that courts are biased and sole custody awards to 
mothers deny fathers their right to parent.  They alleged 
 
 19. Separated Parenting Access and Resource Center, at http:// 
www.deltabravo.net/custody/index.shtml (last visited July 31, 2001).  The Mission 
Statement of the Fathers’ Rights and Equality Exchange, states in part: 
While there are many highly visible interest groups advocating for the 
very real plight of single mothers, few groups speak out for the 
problems encountered by single fathers.  As a result, society has come 
to not only overlook the problems of single fathers, but to view single 
fathers as the root of all evils visited upon the single mother. 
The Fathers’ Rights and Equality Exchange, Mission Statement, at 
http://dadsrights.org/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2001). 
 20. American Coalition for Fathers & Children, ACFC Mission, at http:// 
www.acfc.org/missn.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).  A Minnesota organization, 
The Men’s Defense Association, declares in its mission statement that it intends to 
“assist individuals discriminated against in divorce and other gender matters 
through education and referrals to local resources, especially attorneys.”  Men’s 
Defense Organization, Mission, at http://www.mensdefense.org/ (last modified 
Apr. 11, 2001).  Rev. Pat Robertson declared to a 1996 Christian Coalition rally: 
And I watched little by little an unremitting assault by the left wing 
forces, the ACLU, and the National Organization of Women, and 
other radical groups who began . . . then to assault the institution of 
marriage . . . .  [S]tarting about 1970 . . . in almost every state this left 
wing radical extremist coalition battered down the walls of intact 
families and passed what were called no fault divorce laws. 
James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 885 n.40 (Summer 
2000). 
 21. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE 
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 15 (1995) (describing 
how state policies are implemented to halt any trends that diverge from the 
traditional nuclear family); Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving The Family: 
Challenging The Paradigm Of The Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505 
(1998) (discussing judicial and legislative biases against “non-traditional family 
units”). 
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that, in most cases, mothers are awarded sole custody, with 
fathers granted visitation rights.  The men cite this as 
proof of bias against fathers.22 
The National Organization of Women issued a nationwide 
alert in 1996 warning of the increased power of fathers’ rights 
groups.23 
As already touched upon earlier in this article, the nation and 
Minnesota are undergoing enormous social changes, which are 
having their greatest impact on the family structure.  Recent figures 
released by the Census Bureau show that of the nation’s 105 
million households, only 24% consist of married couples with their 
own children.24  With 25% of American homes occupied by singles 
living alone,25 there are more single people than traditional 
families.  Furthermore, the number of single-parent households 
 
 22. Gloria Woods, “Father’s Rights” Groups: Beware Their Real Agenda, NAT’L 
NOW TIMES, March 1997, available at http://www.now.org/nnt/03-97/father.html 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2001). 
 23. National Organization of Women, NOW Action Alert on “Fathers’ Rights”, at 
http://www.now.org/organiza/conferen/1996/resoluti.html (last visited August 
24, 2001).  The Alert states: 
WHEREAS the objectives of [fathers’ rights] groups are to increase 
restrictions and limits on custodial parents’ rights and to decrease 
child support obligations of non custodial parents by using the abuse 
of power in order to control in the same fashion as do batterers; and 
WHEREAS these groups are fulfilling their objectives by forming 
political alliances with conservative Republican legislators and others 
and by working for the adoption of legislation such as presumption of 
joint custody, penalties for “false reporting” of domestic and child 
abuse and mediation instead of court hearings; and . . . 
WHEREAS many judges and attorneys are still biased against women 
and fathers are awarded custody 70% of the time when they seek it per 
the Association of Child Enforcement Support (ACES); 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the National Organization for 
Women (NOW) begin a national alert to inform members about these 
“fathers’ rights” groups and their objectives through articles in the 
National Now Times (NNT); and . . . 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that NOW encourage state and local 
Chapters to conduct and coordinate divorce/custody court watch 
projects to facilitate removal of biased judges . . . . 
Id. 
 24. Jason Fields & Lynne M. Casper, America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 
Population Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, June 
2001, at 3, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf (last  
visited Sept. 16, 2001) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU REPORT]. 
 25. Id. 
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has grown by 18% over the last thirty years.26  Of this 18%, 14% 
reflects the number of single-mother households.27  In two million 
homes, up 4% in thirty years, fathers raise their children without a 
mother.28  This number represents one household in fifty-two.29 
The census data for Minnesota is consistent with that of the 
rest of the nation.  The traditional family—a married couple with 
their own children—accounts for a little more than a quarter of 
Minnesota’s households.30  While the raw number of married 
families grew slightly in the 1990s, the growth was much faster for 
other kinds of families.  For example, the number of married 
couples without children younger than eighteen grew by more than 
10%31 and accounted for 28.5% of all Minnesota households.32  For 
the first time, there are more householders living alone in 
Minnesota—509,46833—than there are married couples with 
children under eighteen. 
Single parents with children younger than eighteen account 
for over 11% of all American households,34 up from 6.8% in 1990.35  
Ten years ago, single mothers outnumbered single fathers by more 
than four-to-one, however, they now outnumber single fathers by a 
ratio of three-to-one.36 
The impact of gender-interested political groups will continue 
to play a role in legislation.  However, with the changing structure 
of the family and as traditional parenting roles become blurred, it 
may be that the gender of the particular parent will not be 
considered as relevant as finding new ways for children to maintain 
 
 26. Id. at 7. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 3. 
 30. Profile of General Demographic Characteristics for Minnesota: 2000, 
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/tables/dp_mn_2000 
.PDF [hereinafter Profile 2000]. 
 31. In 2000, there were 540,630 married families without minor children in 
Minnesota.  Id.  In 1990, there were only 482,527 such families.  Profile of General 
Demographic Characteristics for Minnesota: 1990, available at http:// 
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/tables/dp_mn_1990.PDF [hereinafter 
Profile 1990]. 
 32. Profile 2000, supra note 30. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Out of a total of 105 million households in the U.S., ten million were 
single-mother families and two million were single-father families.  CENSUS BUREAU 
REPORT, supra note 24, at 3, 7. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Compare id. with Profile 1990, supra note 31. 
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meaningful, close, regular relationships with both parents following 
divorce. 
III. MINNESOTA’S RELOCATION STANDARD 
Minnesota has a fascinating relocation history which is closely 
linked to several external factors.  These factors include society’s 
increased mobility, the emergence of no-fault divorce, greater 
acceptance of divorce, increased employment opportunities for 
women of all ages, and men and women remarrying in significant 
numbers following divorce.  Minnesota’s relocation story began 
when the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Eberhart v. Eberhart.37 
The Eberharts were married in August 1915, a son was born to 
them in 1916, and in 1918 Cora attempted to divorce Walter, 
alleging cruel and inhuman treatment.38  The trial did not go well, 
and Cora was denied a divorce.  On the issue of the custody of their 
youngster, the trial judge ruled that during the couple’s separation, 
Cora should have custody from November 1 until May 1 each year, 
and that Walter should have custody from May 1 to November 1.39  
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling.40 
At some point during the litigation, Cora fled Minnesota with 
the minor child.41  The relocation issue arose during the second 
round of litigation between Cora and Walter when Walter refused 
to support either Cora or the minor child while they were outside 
Minnesota.42  Walter’s motion to relieve him of his support 
obligation was granted by the trial judge, and Cora appealed.43  In 
reviewing the matter, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial judge stating that unless Cora returned to Minnesota with the 
child so Walter could exercise visitation, he no longer had a 
support obligation.44 
At the time Eberhart was decided, most state courts were 
concerned about losing personal jurisdiction over a party who left 
 
 37. 149 Minn. 192, 183 N.W. 140 (1921). 
 38. Id. at 193, 183 N.W. at 140. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 194, 183 N.W. at 141. 
 41. Eberhart v. Eberhart, 153 Minn. 66, 68, 189 N.W. 592, 592 (1922). 
 42. Id. at 68, 189 N.W. at 593. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 68, 189 N.W. at 592 (“The plaintiff has taken the child from the 
jurisdiction of the court.  So long as she keeps him without the jurisdiction, the 
defendant should be relieved from the payment of support money to accrue in the 
future and that already accrued should not be enforced against him.”). 
8
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the jurisdiction.  Legal scholars were just inventing long-arm 
statutes and debate over their application was wide-spread.  Society 
was becoming more mobile and Henry Ford’s Model “T” Ford 
began making an impact,45 but highways, decent roads, and good 
bridges were yet to be constructed, and modern air travel was 
nonexistent.  Divorces, of course, were rare.  Few women held jobs 
outside the home and only a handful occupied positions within a 
profession such as law. 
Eberhart was followed in 1940 by Anderson v. Anderson,46 where a 
wife violated an express provision of the divorce decree prohibiting 
her from taking the parties’ child outside Minnesota.47  The Eberhart 
rule as to future installments of support money, however, was 
distinguished and modified by the court in 1954 by Iverson v. 
Iverson,48 where the wife had defeated the husband’s right of 
visitation by removing the children to California.49  In Iverson, the 
trial court granted the wife’s motion for a modification of the 
original divorce decree expressly to permit her to live with the 
children in California and to require the husband to pay for their 
support in the future.50 
Eberhart was reconsidered by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
1956 in State of Illinois ex rel. Shannon v. Sterling.51  The outcome in 
Shannon reflects, at least in part, the extent to which society had 
changed in the three decades following Eberhart. 
The parties in Shannon, Barbara Shannon and Kenneth 
Sterling, divorced, and the trial court granted sole physical custody 
of the minor children to Barbara while providing Kenneth with 
reasonable visitation.52  Following the divorce, Barbara left 
Minnesota for Illinois without permission of the court or Kenneth.53  
Relying on Eberhart, Kenneth refused to provide any support.54  
 
 45. Toyota Japan, Toyota Automobile Museum, at http://www.toyota.co.jp/ 
Museum/Tam/Car/ Ford2/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).  Henry Ford was able to 
mass produce the Model T and sell it for about $850.  Id.  He began assembly line 
production of the model T in 1913.  Id.  Production of the Model T ended on May 
27, 1927.  Id. 
 46. 207 Minn. 338, 291 N.W. 508 (1940). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 243 Minn. 54, 66 N.W.2d 549 (1954). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 57, 66 N.W.2d at 551. 
 51. 248 Minn. 266, 80 N.W.2d 13 (1956). 
 52. Id. at 269, 80 N.W.2d at 16. 
     53.    Id. 
     54.    Id. 
9
Oliphant: Minnesota's Custody Relocation Doctrine: Is There a Need for Chan
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
07_FORMAT.OLIPHANT.10.12.01.DOC 11/1/2001  6:01 PM 
732 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2 
Barbara, while remaining in Illinois, initiated an action in 
Minnesota challenging Kenneth’s decision.55  The trial judge, 
relying on Eberhart, dismissed Barbara’s support request on the 
ground that she had deprived Kenneth of his visitation rights by 
relocating without his consent or court approval.56 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court modified the 
relocation views it had expressed in Eberhart.  Consistent with 
Eberhart, it held that a wife, who deprives her husband of his right 
of visitation by relocating without court approval or without the 
husband’s consent, cannot compel the husband to pay her any of 
the support obligation that accrued during the period he was 
denied visitation.57  However, it also held that a trial judge 
possessed the power to modify the divorce decree to permit the 
children to remain outside Minnesota and compel support from 
the father without mandating the return of the custodial parent to 
Minnesota.58 
The Shannon court was influenced by the recently adopted 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), which 
allowed interstate resolution of support issues.  The court held that 
despite the express terms of an original divorce decree, URESA 
could be utilized to modify a husband’s visitation and authorize a 
custodial wife to reside with the children outside the state and 
compel the husband to pay for the future support of the children.59  
The ruling erased the harsh view taken in Eberhart. 
The most significant change in Minnesota’s relocation law 
occurred almost two decades ago when the Minnesota Supreme 
Court decided Auge v. Auge.60  Since this decision, the court has not 
directly revisited the issue. 
The parties, Carol Ann (Auge) Berc and Frank Daniel Auge, 
were married in 1974, separated in 1975, and divorced in 1979.61  
In 1975 a child, Frank Daniel Auge, Jr., was born to them.  Frank 
Junior suffered from physical disabilities.62 
When they divorced, Carol Ann received sole, physical custody 
 
     55.     Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 273, 80 N.W.2d at 18. 
 58. Id. at 274, 80 N.W.2d at 19. 
 59. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518.41-518.52 (1956). 
 60. 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983). 
 61. Appellant’s Br. at 6, Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983) (No. 
CX-82-1323). 
 62. Id. 
10
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of Frank Junior, and Frank Senior was awarded visitation that 
encompassed alternate weekends, one week during the child’s 
Christmas vacation period, and four weeks during the summer.63 
In 1979 Carol Ann began living with Max Berc, Sr.,64 who is 
described in various court documents as “over sixty years old,” 
possessing a net worth “in excess of three million dollars,” and 
owning extensive business holdings in Hawaii with an annual 
income in excess of $185,000.65  Two children were born to Max 
and Carol Ann, and she was pregnant with a third when they were 
married in Hawaii in January 1983.66 
In 1981, Carol Ann asked the Ramsey County, Minnesota 
district court to allow her to relocate with Frank Junior to Hawaii 
from December 5, 1981 to June 5, 1982.67 She stated that the move 
was necessitated by the business activities of her live-in partner.68 
Frank Senior responded by moving for a court order giving 
him sole physical custody of the child.69  Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial judge granted Carol Ann permission to relocate 
with Frank Junior to Hawaii for the requested six-month period.70  
The judge conditioned the order on Carol Ann providing Frank 
Senior with funds for round-trip transportation for himself between 
St. Paul and Honolulu and either suitable accommodations for 
himself and the child for up to ten days or a sum equal to $45 per 
day for up to ten days.71  Carol Ann was also ordered to provide 
funds sufficient for a second round-trip air ticket.72  She and the 
minor child left Minnesota in December for Hawaii. 
In the summer of 1982, Carol Ann brought another removal 
request to the Ramsey County, Minnesota district court.73  This time 
she asked the court for permission to relocate with Frank Junior to 
Hawaii from November through May.  Frank Senior countered that 
he was not able to afford to take the trips to Hawaii, which had 
been contemplated by the 1981 order, and asserted that the new 
 
 63. Id. at 7. 
 64. Id. at 8. 
 65. App. to Appellant’s Br. at 51, Auge (No. CX-82-1323); Resp’t. Br. at 5, 
Auge (No. CX-82-1323). 
 66. Resp’t. Br. at 5, Auge (No. CX-82-1323). 
 67. Id. at 6. 
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. Appellant’s Br. at 10, Auge (No. CX-82-1323). 
 70. Id. at 11. 
 71. Id. at 11-12. 
 72. App. to Appellant’s Br. at 13, Auge (No. CX-82-1323). 
 73. Appellant’s Br. at 14, Auge (No. CX-82-1323). 
11
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request was an attempt to interfere with his visitation rights.74  He 
again asked that he receive sole physical custody of Frank Junior.75 
Without conducting a hearing, the Referee appointed to hear 
the dispute ruled that Carol Ann’s request was “contrary to the best 
interests of the child.”76  The referee also found “no deep business 
necessity” for Max Berc to take Frank Junior and his mother to 
Hawaii.  The district court affirmed the Referee’s ruling and Carol 
Ann sought an expedited hearing with the Minnesota Supreme 
Court via a Writ of Mandamus.77  The petition was denied,78 
however, and the normal appeal process took over.79 
With the mandamus petition dismissed, and a decision on the 
appeal months away, the trial judge granted Frank Senior’s request 
that he be awarded temporary physical custody of Frank Junior.80  
Carol Ann, Max and the minor children, except Frank Junior, left 
Minnesota for Hawaii in November 1982.81 
In the summer of 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued 
its ruling and established a new set of legal principles to apply in 
relocation disputes.  These principles remain intact to the present. 
The court was obviously upset over the trial judge’s decision 
changing sole, physical custody from Carol Ann to Frank Senior 
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.  It held that 
because denying a custodial parent’s permission to relocate to 
another state effectuates a change in custody, a trial judge cannot 
issue such an order without first conducting a full evidentiary 
hearing where witnesses may be cross-examined.82 
The court then weighed in heavily on the side of supporting a 
custodial parent’s relocation effort.  It held that Minnesota Statutes 
section 518.18(d), which on its face is silent on the matter, 
contained an implicit presumption that relocation must be 
permitted, subject only to the non-custodial parent’s ability to 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Resp’t Br. at 10, Auge (No. CX-82-1323). 
 76. Appellant’s Br. at 15, Auge (No. CX-82-1323); Resp’t Br. at 10, Auge (No. 
CX-82-1323). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Appellant’s Br. at 15, Auge (No. CX-82-1323).  The writ was denied 
October 27, 1982.  Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 15-16. 
 81. Id. at 16. 
 82. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396; see also Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 
1985). 
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establish that relocation is not in the child’s best interests.83  The 
implicit presumption theory sprang from discussions the court 
found in a student law review note,84 articles by Goldstein, Frend, 
Solnit and Mnookin,85 and decisions from South Dakota,86 New 
Jersey,87 and a handful of other jurisdictions.88  The court observed 
that New Jersey’s relocation statute, which at the time was similar to 
Minnesota’s, “allows removal only upon ‘cause shown.’”89  This 
phrase was viewed, however, as not including the whole range of 
issues going to primary custody, but rather the probability of 
assuring reasonable visitation to the non-custodial parent.90 
Auge directed trial judges to presume that a relocation request 
was in the best interests of the child,91 and if opposed by the non-
custodian for reasons of health, education or religion, they were to 
defer to the custodial parent’s decisions unless, after an evidentiary 
hearing, it was determined that “failure to limit the custodial 
parent’s authority will endanger the child’s health or 
development.”92 
 
 83. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396.  Minnesota Statutes § 518.18(d) stated that in 
modification proceedings, 
the court shall retain the custodian established by the prior order 
unless: . . . (iii) The child’s present environment endangers his 
physical or emotional health or impairs his emotional development 
and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is 
outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child. 
MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (1982). 
 84. Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implications for the Right to 
Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 361 n.124 (1981). 
 85. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 8-11 
(1979); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face 
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 226, 265 (1975). 
 86. In re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1981). 
 87. D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). 
 88. The court cited the following as examples: In re Marriage of Siklossy, 409 
N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 826 
(Iowa 1978); Hale v. Hale, 429 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).  It also 
observed that other courts took a more middle-of-the-road approach, establishing 
no presumption but allowing removal if it is in the best interests of the child and 
giving as examples: Hutchins v. Hutchins, 269 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1978); Jafari v. Jafari, 284 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1979).  
 89. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1983) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
9:2-2 (West 1976)). 
 90. Id. at 396. 
 91. Id. at 399; see also Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Minn. 1983). 
 92. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399-400 (citing MINN. STAT. § 518.176, subd. 1 
(1982)).  See, e.g., Knott v. Knott, 418 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(allowing removal to California of two children not clearly erroneous where 
13
Oliphant: Minnesota's Custody Relocation Doctrine: Is There a Need for Chan
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
07_FORMAT.OLIPHANT.10.12.01.DOC 11/1/2001  6:01 PM 
736 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2 
The court incorporated its relocation principles into 
application of Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d), with the consequence that a 
non-custodial parent could not prevent relocation, absent a prima 
facie showing that relocation would harm the child’s physical or 
emotional health.  Incorporating the statute provided additional 
support for custodial parents considering relocation.93 
The court also accepted the “different family unit theory,” first 
espoused by the New Jersey Supreme Court in D’Onofrio v. 
D’Onofrio:94 
The children, after the parents’ divorce or separation, 
belong to a different family unit than they did when the 
parents lived together.  The new family unit consists only 
of the children and the custodial parent, and what is 
advantageous to that unit as a whole, to each of its 
members individually and to the way they relate to each 
other and function together is obviously in the best 
interests of the children.  It is in the context of what is 
best for that family unit that the precise nature and terms 
of visitation and changes in visitation by the non-custodial 
parent must be considered.95 
The court in Auge rationalized its new relocation principles on 
three bases: First, they obviated de novo consideration of which 
parent is the better custodian, where the issue had earlier been 
 
noncustodian failed to establish a prima facie case that move was not in the best 
interest of the two children sought to be removed); Lucas v. Lucas, 389 N.W.2d 
744, 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating non-custodial parent must establish by 
preponderance of evidence that move is not in best interest of child); Corwin v. 
Corwin, 366 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding custodial parent 
may remove child from state absent proof that the move would endanger child’s 
best interest); Benson v. Benson, 346 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) 
(allowing motion by custodial parent to be granted unless the party opposing the 
motion establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the move is not in the 
best interest of the child ); Meyer v. Meyer, 346 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984) (requiring that permission be given to the custodial parent to remove a 
child from the state unless the non-custodial parent establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the move is not in the best interests of the 
child or is sought for the purpose of interfering with the non-custodial parent’s 
visitation rights).  
 93. MINN. STAT. § 518.176, subd. 1; see also Lucas v. Lucas, 389 N.W.2d 744, 
747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that because respondent did not rebut 
answers to questions raised at the hearing, the trial court maintained the burden 
of finding reliable evidence of the best interests of the children before it finally 
approved the move). 
 94. 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). 
 95. Id. at 29-30. 
14
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resolved.96  Second, they maintained the child in the family unit to 
which, in the eyes of the court, the child “currently belongs,” and 
minimizes judicial interference with decisions affecting that family 
unit.97  Finally, they placed the decision regarding a minor child 
“with the person best able to consider the child’s needs.”98 
The court also observed that, in the past, relocation requests 
were sometimes denied because of the potential loss of jurisdiction 
over custody issues.99  However, with the adoption of the Uniform 
Child Custody Act100 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
of 1980,101 it felt that these historic concerns were no longer 
significant.  The Auge doctrine has been followed in numerous 
decisions and remains the law in Minnesota today.102 
IV.  COMPARING MINNESOTA’S RELOCATION STANDARD WITH OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS 
When Minnesota’s post-divorce relocation standard is 
 
     96.    Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399. 
     97.    Id. 
 98. Id.; see Meyer v. Meyer, 346 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) 
(stating children’s interests are to be considered in the context of what is best for 
the family unit made up of the children and the custodial parent). 
     99.    Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399. 
 100. MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01-.25 (1982). 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. V 1981). 
 102. See, e.g., Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 1999); 
Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996); Ayers v. Ayers, 508 
N.W.2d 515, 519 (Minn. 1993); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 213 (Minn. 
1988); In re Welfare of J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1986); In re Welfare of 
J.W., 391 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1986); Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19, 25 
(Minn. 1985); Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 270 (Minn. 1983); State ex rel 
Gunderson v. Preuss, 336 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Minn. 1983); In re A.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 
43, 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Ballard v. Wold, 486 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992); Spaeth v. Warren, 478 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Crippen, J., dissenting) 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Geiger v. Geiger, 470 N.W.2d 704, 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991); Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); 
Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 396 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Haasken v. 
Haasken, 396 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); In re Welfare of B.E.N., 392 
N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Lucas v. Lucas, 389 N.W.2d 744, 746 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Pekarek v. Pekarek, 384 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986); Sydnes v. Sydnes, 388 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Vogt v. Vogt, 385 
N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Johnson v. Smith, 374 N.W.2d 317, 321  
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Kellen v. Kellen, 367 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985); Otava v. Otava, 374 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Adam v. Adam, 
358 N.W.2d 487, 488 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Benson v. Benson, 346 N.W.2d 196, 
198  (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Meyer v. Meyer, 346 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984); Tieso v. Hansen, 349 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).  
15
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compared to that found in other jurisdictions, it is apparent that 
Minnesota has created a standard that is among the most liberal in 
the nation.103  As noted earlier, this liberal standard was created by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court out of a custody modification 
provision that some had viewed as favoring the non-custodial 
parent.104  Minnesota is not alone in its liberal, pro-relocation view, 
however, and has been joined by Wisconsin, South Dakota, 
California and several other jurisdictions.  Moreover, a recent 
survey of relocation decisions in America indicates that the “vast 
majority” of courts are permitting post-divorce custodial parent 
relocation.105 
Minnesota and the jurisdictions favoring liberal relocation 
combine a few well-established facts with a handful of assumptions 
 
 103. Minnesota will grant an evidentiary hearing in a relocation dispute only if 
the affidavits submitted by the non-custodial parent, taken as true, establish a 
prima facie case.  Nice-Peterson v. Nice-Peterson, 310 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. 
1981).  To establish a prima facie case, the moving party must demonstrate a 
change of circumstance in the child’s environment that endangers the child’s 
physical or emotional health or emotional development, that a modification 
would be in the child’s best interests, and that the advantage of a change will 
outweigh any harm likely caused by the change.  MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (1998); 
see Abbott v. Abbott, 481 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 104. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393.  The court noted that “[t]his statute most 
frequently comes into play upon a non-custodial parent’s motion that custody be 
transferred to him or her, rather than in the context of a motion for removal from 
the state.”  Id. at 396-97.  The court found the underlying considerations of both 
issues similar and viewed denying the custodial parent permission to relocate as a 
conflict often resulting in a modification of custody.  Id. at 395-96.  In Auge, while 
not excluding other grounds to deny relocation, the court noted only one means 
by which a non-custodial parent could meet this burden: the non-custodial parent 
could show that the purpose of the move is to frustrate the non-custodial parent’s 
visitation rights.  Id.  This view has resulted in a very relaxed standard. 
 105. Elrod & Spector, supra note 15, at 629 (citing Thomas v. Thomas, 705 
N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y. 2000) (considering relocation in awarding the mother primary 
physical custody); see also In Ex parte Monroe, 727 So.2d 104, 106 (Ala. 1999) 
(finding evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s modification of a custody 
order to place the child with the father if the mother moved to Michigan); 
Pearson v. Pearson, 5 P.3d 239, 243-44 (Alaska 2000) (allowing mother to move to 
Pennsylvania and modifying father’s visitation); Walkowiak v. Walkowiak, 749 
So.2d 855, 859 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (finding no error for court to make mother 
primary domiciliary parent and allow her to relocate to her home state); 
Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592, 599-600 (Neb. 1999) (concluding 
career opportunities sufficient to allow the mother to move); Chen v. Heller, 759 
A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); In re Henion, 699 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding preponderance of evidence showed relocation in 
best interest of children); In re Marriage of Pape, 989 P.2d 1120 (Wash. 1999), as 
corrected, (Feb. 15, 2000).  Contra Stark v. Anderson, 748 So.2d 838, 838 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 1999) (ruling evidence sufficient to change custody to father). 
16
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about the future improvement in the life of the custodial parent to 
support their position.  The facts relied upon include recognition 
that society is increasingly mobile, that there is a high incidence of 
divorce and remarriage, and both parents often move following 
divorce.106  The assumption the jurisdictions make is that relocation 
will result in a better life and greater happiness for the custodian, 
and that this will positively affect the minor child.107 
These jurisdictions also see liberal relocation as an important 
equalizing factor in post-divorce life.108  They reason that because 
there are no legal relocation constraints on a non-custodial parent, 
it would be unfair to impose relocation restrictions on the custodial 
parent, even if the new location is geographically distant from the 
child’s residence.109  They believe that the custodial parent should 
be entitled to the same opportunity for a better life as that 
provided the non-custodial parent.  For these jurisdictions, a liberal 
relocation standard helps accomplish this goal.110 
The liberal relocation jurisdictions adopt the principle that a 
custodial parent’s relocation request is presumptively in the child’s 
best interests.  The presumption also provides the custodial parent 
with a significant amount of security by permitting relocation while 
retaining custody.  The presumption is linked to an assumption 
that it will help promote stability in the custodial parent’s 
relationship with the minor child. 
The liberal relocation jurisdictions also support the use of 
presumptions on pragmatic grounds.  They believe that 
presumptions help prevent future litigation problems by reducing 
custody relocation disputes, usually simplify the issues in a dispute, 
and provide the custodial parent with confidence in knowing how a 
court will most likely decide a relocation issue.111  Furthermore, 
 
 106. It is claimed by some that this mode of behavior is “coming to represent 
the norm.”  Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: 
Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 
FAM. L.Q. 305, 310 (1996). 
 107. See, e.g., Madgett v. Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding that “[t]here is a presumption that a request by the custodial parent to 
remove the child to another state is in the best interests of the child . . . to 
encourage continuity and stability in post-dissolution family relationships.”). 
 108. See, e.g., D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1976). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Ann M. Driscoll, In Search of a Standard: Resolving the Relocation Problem in 
New York, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 187 (1997). 
17
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presumptions are viewed as useful in reducing unchecked judicial 
discretion.112 
Under Minnesota’s liberal standard, the custodial parent is 
protected by both a favorable presumption and a “harm” barrier 
that the noncustodian must overcome if the move is to be 
prevented.  Absent a showing that relocation would psychologically 
or physically harm a child, a custodial parent may relocate to 
another state.  Although the meaning of “harm” is unclear, 
relocation would probably be denied where a child with a serious 
medical condition was relocating to an area where the condition 
cannot be adequately treated. 
The more conservative relocation jurisdictions tend to 
emphasize that the child’s interests are separate from those of the 
parents.  They utilize presumptions favoring the non-custodial 
parent and place the burden of proving that the move is in a child’s 
best interests on the parent seeking to relocate.113 
The conservative jurisdictions assume that the distance 
between the child and the non-custodial parent may be a 
significant detrimental factor in continuing the child’s healthy 
development.  They link distance and irregular visits created by 
distance to their belief that everything reasonably possible should 
be done to preserve and foster both parents’ relationships with the 
child. 
A few jurisdictions, such as Maryland, seem to be moving 
toward a neutral view of relocation.114 
The wide variety of national standards suggests that relocation 
decisions may turn more on the doctrinal view of a particular 
jurisdiction than the best interests of a minor child.115  The 
following analysis from a handful of representative jurisdictions 
 
 112. See Costa v. Costa, 429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1983). 
 113. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 889 P.2d 633, 636 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that although the custodial parent should show an advantage to the 
move, it is only one of several factors which the court may consider); Staab v. 
Hurst, 868 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994) (placing burden on custodial 
parent to show “some real advantage” to relocation); Ramos v. Ramos, 697 So. 2d 
280, 283 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling burden on custodial parent to prove that “the 
move is in the child’s best interest”). 
 114. See Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and 
Custodial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 293 (1996) 
(noting that Maryland courts have classified the new relocation statute as neutral, 
although it appears to favor the non-custodial parent). 
 115. See Mandy S. Cohen, A Toss of the Dice . . . The Gamble With Post Divorce-
Relocation Laws, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 136-49 (1989). 
18
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further illustrates the national conflict over relocation standards. 
South Dakota has a liberal relocation standard similar to 
Minnesota’s; it places minimal relocation restrictions on the 
custodial parent.  In Fortin v. Fortin,116 the court ruled that a non-
custodial parent does not have a right to prior notice of relocation 
and possesses no opportunity to be heard in opposition to the 
relocation, unless the noncustodian initiates an action for a 
restraining order.117  The burden of proof is placed on the non-
custodial parent to show how the relocation is inconsistent with the 
child’s best interests.118 
 Wisconsin has a liberal relocation standard and employs 
statutory presumptions favoring relocation that generally dictate 
the outcome of relocation disputes.119  Wisconsin also requires that 
 
 116. 500 N.W.2d 229, 232 (S.D. 1993). 
 117. The South Dakota statute reads as follows: “A parent entitled to the 
custody of a child has the right to change his residence, subject to the power of 
the circuit court to restrain a removal which would prejudice the rights or welfare 
of the child.”  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-13 (Michie 1984). 
 118. See Jennifer L. Linngren, Note, The Feuding Fortins: South Dakota Adopts a 
Presumption in Favor of the Custodial Parent’s Right to Remove a Minor Child from the 
Jurisdiction in Fortin v. Fortin, 39 S.D. L. REV. 661, 662 (1994). 
 119. WIS. STAT. § 767.327(3)(a)2.a (2000) provides: 
There is a rebuttable presumption that continuing the current 
allocation of decision making under a legal custody order or 
continuing the child’s physical placement with the parent with whom 
the child resides for the greater period of time is in the best interest of 
the child.  This presumption may be overcome by a showing that the 
move or removal is unreasonable and not in the best interest of the 
child. 
Id.  Section 767.327 provides, as material here: 
Moving the child’s residence within or outside the state. 
(3) STANDARDS FOR MODIFICATION OR PROHIBITION IF MOVE 
OR REMOVAL CONTESTED. 
(a) 1.  Except as provided under par. (b), if the parent proposing the 
move or removal has sole custody or joint legal custody of the child 
and the child resides with that parent for the greater period of time, 
the parent objecting to the move or removal may file a petition, 
motion or order to show cause for modification of the legal custody or 
physical placement order affecting the child. The court may modify the 
legal custody or physical placement order if, after considering the 
factors under sub. (5), the court finds all of the following: 
a. The modification is in the best interest of the child. 
b. The move or removal will result in a substantial change of 
circumstances since the entry of the last order affecting legal custody 
or the last order substantially affecting physical placement. 
2. With respect to sub.1.: 
19
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the non-custodial parent, objecting to a relocation request, petition 
for a change in custody, and then overcome the presumption that 
the move is in the best interests of the child.  In Kerkvliet v. 
Kerkvliet,120 relocation was allowed even though the custodial 
mother’s motive for moving with the children was deemed “feeble 
and insensitive.”121  Wisconsin courts view the relocation issue as 
involving not whether to allow the move, but rather whether to 
transfer custody to the non-custodial parent in the event that the 
move actually took place.122 
North Dakota is a conservative jurisdiction, and its relocation 
law markedly differs from that of Minnesota, Wisconsin, or South 
Dakota.  In North Dakota, if a non-custodial parent receives 
visitation rights in a divorce decree,123 a custodial parent “may not 
change the residence of the child to another state except upon 
order of the court or with the consent of the non-custodial parent.”  
The purpose of this standard is said to protect the non-custodial 
parent’s visitation rights where the custodial parent wants to move 
out of the state.124  North Dakota places the burden on the 
custodial parent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
relocation is “in the best interests of the child,”125 and emphasizes 
 
a. There is a rebuttable presumption that continuing the current 
allocation of decision making under a legal custody order or 
continuing the child’s physical placement with the parent with whom 
the child resides for the greater period of time is in the best interest of 
the child. This presumption may be overcome by a showing that the 
move or removal is unreasonable and not in the best interest of the 
child. 
b. A change in the economic circumstances or marital status of either 
party is not sufficient to meet the standards for modification under 
that subdivision. 
Id. § 767.327(3). 
 120. 480 N.W.2d 823 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). 
 121. Id. at 829. 
 122. Id. at 826. 
 123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-07 (1999); see also Henz v. Henz, 624 N.W.2d 
694, 696 (N.D. 2001). 
 124. Olson v. Olson, 611 N.W.2d 892, 894 (N.D. 2000); Hanson v. Hanson, 567 
N.W.2d 216, 218 (N.D. 1997). 
 125. See Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D. 1997); see also Tishmack v. 
Tishmack, 611 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 2000); Keller v. Keller, 584 N.W.2d 509, 512 
(N.D. 1998).  The court has specified four factors for consideration in 
determining if a requested change in a child’s residence to another state is in the 
child’s best interest: (1) the prospective advantages of the move in improving the 
custodial parent’s and child’s quality of life; (2) the integrity of the custodial 
parent’s motive for relocation, considering whether it is to defeat or deter 
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that visitation is not merely a privilege of the non-custodial parent, 
but a right of the children.  Visitation is presumed to be in the 
children’s best interests.126 
Connecticut does not align itself with Minnesota’s liberal 
relocation standard or with states such as North Dakota; rather, it 
attempts to adhere to a middle-of-the-road relocation view.  In 
Ireland v. Ireland,127 the court held that when a custodial parent 
seeks permission to relocate, the initial burden is on that parent to 
demonstrate that the relocation is for a legitimate purpose and the 
proposed relocation is reasonable in light of that purpose.  Once 
the custodial parent has made a prima facie showing, the burden 
then shifts to the non-custodial parent to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the relocation is not in the 
best interests of the child.  The court reasoned that if it required 
the custodial parent to forego potential benefits of relocation—
such as educational, employment or marriage opportunities—it 
would result in denying the minor child the correlative benefits of 
such opportunities such as increased financial or emotional 
stability of the family unit.128 
Colorado’s relocation view is similar to that of Connecticut.  In 
In re Marriage of Francis,129 the Colorado Supreme Court held that in 
removal cases, “the custodial parent must present a prima facie case 
 
visitation by the non-custodial parent; (3) the integrity of the non-custodial 
parent’s motives for opposing the move; (4) the potential negative impact on the 
relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child, including whether 
there is a realistic opportunity for visitation which can provide an adequate basis 
for preserving and fostering the non-custodial parent’s relationship with the child 
if relocation is allowed, and the likelihood that each parent will comply with such 
alternate visitation.  “No one factor dominates, and a factor that has minor impact 
in one case may be the dominant factor in another.”  State ex rel. Melling v. Ness, 
592 N.W.2d 565, 569 (N.D. 1999). 
 126. Tibor v. Tibor, 623 N.W.2d 12, 16 (N.D. 2001); see Hendrickson v. 
Hendrickson, 603 N.W.2d 896, 902 (N.D. 2000); Stout, 560 N.W.2d at 911. 
 127. 717 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1998). 
 128. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgham, 408 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(stating “a request [to relocate] would likely indirectly benefit the child by making 
the custodian a happier, better adjusted parent than would be the case if the 
custodian’s freedom of movement was more restrained.”); Cooper v. Cooper, 491 
A.2d 606, 612 (N.J. 1984) (concluding “[b]ecause the best interests of a child are 
so interwoven with the well-being of the custodial parent, the determination of the 
child’s best interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be taken into 
account”); Long v. Long, 381 N.W.2d 350, 355 (Wis. 1986) (saying the trial court 
should not have “ignored the impact of the custodial [parent]’s well-being on the 
children”). 
 129. 919 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1996). 
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showing that there is a sensible reason for the move.”130  Once a 
prima facie case has been established, it is presumed that the best 
interests of the child are to remain with the custodial parent and 
the burden shifts to the non-custodial parent to demonstrate that 
the move is not in the best interests of the child. 
For many years, New York was considered among the most 
restrictive relocation jurisdictions in the nation.  It followed a 
procedure that required the non-custodial parent to prove that 
relocation deprived the non-custodial parent of meaningful 
“access.”  Once that burden was met, the custodial parent then had 
to show “exceptional circumstances” supporting the move.  
However, in Tropea v. Tropea,131 it replaced the “exceptional 
circumstance” test with a detailed inquiry as to what is in the child’s 
best interest.  It held that the outcome of relocation requests 
should be determined by consideration of all relevant facts, with 
predominant emphasis placed on what outcome is most likely to 
serve the “best interests” of the child.132  This approach resembles a 
de novo custody determination.133  While Tropea failed to establish 
 
 130. Id. at 784-85. 
 131. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). 
 132. A trial judge faced with a relocation request in New York is to conduct a 
detailed inquiry into a number of factors including the following: 
(1) the quality of the alternate home environments; (2) a comparison 
of the parental guidance which would be provided to the child if 
relocation were granted and if relocation were denied; (3) the 
financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the child; (4) 
the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s emotional and 
intellectual development; (5) the desires of the child with appropriate 
weight given to the child’s young age and maturity; (6) the quantitative 
and qualitative impact upon the child of losing existing contacts with 
the Father and the community or with the Mother, Step-Father and 
siblings; (7) the quantitative and qualitative impact upon the non-
custodial parent of losing existing contacts with the child; (8) the 
feasibility of devising a visitation schedule or other arrangement that 
will enable the non-custodial parent to maintain a meaningful parent-
child relationship; (9) the difficulty, advantage and disadvantage that 
the child will experience in residing and adapting to a remarkably new 
and different place and culture; (10) the economic necessity or lack 
thereof for wanting to relocate; (11) the existence of good faith in 
requesting and opposing the relocation and whether Respondent’s 
reasons for moving are valid and sound; (12) Respondent’s attempts to 
obtain a “fresh start”; and (13) the continued or exacerbated hostility 
between Petitioner and Respondent if relocation were permitted and if 
relocation were denied. 
Lazarevic v. Fogelquist, 668 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
 133. For a detailed analysis of Tropea v. Tropea, see Edwin J. (Ted) Terry et al., 
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which party should bear the burden of proof as to the child’s best 
interests, lower courts of that state have indicated that the burden 
is on the custodial parent.134 
California adopted a liberal relocation standard in In re 
Marriage of Burgess.135  There, the court held that a custodial parent 
seeking to relocate bears no burden of establishing that the move is 
necessary.136  Rather, the custodial parent has the right to change 
the residence of the child, except in the case of a move detrimental 
to the child or a move intended to deprive the non-custodial parent 
of contact.  The custodial parent need not show that relocation is 
essential or expedient, and the trial court must take into account 
the presumption that the custodial parent has a right to move with 
her child, provided that the move would not be prejudicial to the 
child’s rights or welfare.137 
The South Carolina Supreme Court established a presumption 
against relocation in McAlister v. Patterson.138  However, that state’s 
appellate court has apparently not applied the presumption to any 
relocation case since it was established in 1982.139 
The message sent by the variety of inconsistent relocation 
standards throughout the nation is this: whether relocation is 
allowed may depend on whether a state has created a presumption, 
and then, to whom the presumption is applied.  The standard 
selected, however, may depend on which of the various political 
interest groups have been the most successful in lobbying the 
legislature; or, it may turn on the particular political views of a 
majority of a state’s judiciary. 
 
Relocation: Moving Forward or Moving Backward?, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 983, 987 
(2000). 
 134. See, e.g., Burnham v. Basta, 659 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) 
(placing burden on custodial parent). 
 135. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (involving mother with sole custody who wanted 
to make forty-mile move on the basis of employment). 
 136. Id. at 476, 482.  Prior to Burgess, California courts had required a custodial 
parent seeking to relocate to show that the move was in the child’s best interests.  
See In re Marriage of Hoover, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 737, 740 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 
1995).  In In re Marriage of Carlson, the California Court of Appeal stated that the 
“precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court 
order advanced the best interests of the child.”  In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. 
Rptr. 840, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
   137.    Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478. 
 138. 299 S.E.2d 322 (S.C. 1982). 
 139. Caroline Ritchie Heil, Relocation Cases as Change in Custody Proceedings: 
“Judicial Blackmail” or Competing Interests Reconciled?, 51 S.C. L. REV. 885, 886, 898 
(2000). 
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V.  THE EXPERTS DISAGREE 
The central issue in the national relocation debate focuses on 
the answer to these questions: Is frequent and continuing contact 
with both parents in a child’s best interests?  Or, is a child’s need 
for stability and need to remain with the custodial parent more 
important than maintaining frequent and continuing contact with 
the non-custodial parent on a weekly or bi-weekly basis?  The 
answers provided by experts studying the relocation issue, which 
may have once appeared reasonably clear and without major 
disagreement, are now hotly debated.  Because the experts can’t 
agree, jurisdictions are faced with making hard choices on less than 
reliable scientific evidence. 
Minnesota’s struggle with relocation experts is apparent upon 
examination of decisions such as Silbaugh v. Silbaugh.140  In this 
dispute, Meredith Silbaugh, who was awarded sole physical custody 
of the couple’s children following divorce, notified her ex-husband 
John that she wished to relocate to Arizona with their children.141  
John opposed the move, and the couple sought resolution through 
mediation.142  When mediation failed, Meredith petitioned the 
court to authorize relocation.143  John requested an evidentiary 
hearing or, in the alternative, modification of the judgment making 
him the child’s primary custodian should Meredith leave 
Minnesota.144 
In support of his motion to obtain an evidentiary hearing, 
which required a prima facie showing of endangerment, John 
attached a number of affidavits to his moving papers.145  They 
included sworn statements by his brother and sister, whose children 
regularly played with John and Meredith’s children, his pastor, a 
friend, and an acquaintance of both parties, who related an 
instance of alcohol use by Meredith’s fiancé.146  In John’s affidavit, 
he claimed that Meredith and her fiancé abused alcohol.147 
John retained Dr. Charles Cutler, a licensed psychologist, to 
 
 140. 543 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1996). 
   141.    Id. at 640. 
   142.    Id. 
   143.    Id. 
   144.    Id. 
   145.    Id. 
   146.    Id. 
   147.    Id. 
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aid him in assessing the impact Meredith’s move would have on the 
children.148  Dr. Cutler had prepared a report based on interviews 
with the children, and John attached the report to his moving 
papers.149  In his report, Dr. Cutler stated that the children had 
mixed feelings about the move and had indicated to him that they 
preferred to spend more time with John.  In Dr. Cutler’s opinion, 
relocating the children would be harmful to their emotional well-
being and development and would not be in their best interests.150 
In terms of legal precedent in support of his motion for a 
hearing, John relied on a 1984 decision, Benson v. Benson.151 
In response to John’s motion, Meredith submitted an affidavit 
in support of the move.  She stated that she had a career 
opportunity in Arizona that had the potential for a better lifestyle 
for herself and the children.152  She also stated that her fiancé had 
purchased a home in Arizona and a lake cabin in Minnesota.153  
Meredith proposed a new visitation schedule that included return 
visits to Minnesota during the summer months to accommodate 
extended visitation for the children with John.154  As legal 
precedent in support of denying John an evidentiary hearing, 
Meredith relied on a 1991 decision, Geiger v. Geiger.155 
 
   148.    Id. 
   149.    Id. 
   150.    Id. 
 151. 346 N.W.2d 196, 198-99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (reversing the district 
court’s finding that the appellant had failed to make a prima facie showing against 
removal).  The appellate court found serious questions surrounding the 
respondent’s impending marriage, the children’s new home, and the lack of 
necessary medical care for one of the children.  Id. 
   152.    Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d at 640. 
   153.    Id. 
   154.    Id. 
 155. 470 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. 
Aug. 1, 1991) (affirming the district court’s ruling that the appellant had failed to 
make a prima facie case against removal).  The court held that, aside from the 
natural adjustments and difficulties of moving, the appellant had “cited no specific 
facts to show how the move would be against the children’s best interests.”  Id.; see 
Knott v. Knott, 418 N.W.2d 505, 507, 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding the 
district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing despite affidavits by appellant and 
two doctors stating that the child’s asthma would be temporarily exacerbated by 
the move; the district court had reasoned that adequate medical care could be 
arranged in the child’s new state); Madgett v. Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the absence of any “indication of poor 
performance in school, increased illness, [or] reports from psychologists, teachers, 
or friends” was fatal to appellant’s attempt to make a prima facie showing against 
removal). 
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The trial judge reviewed the various documents and ruled that 
John had failed to establish a prima facie case of endangerment.  
Meredith’s request to relocate was granted.156  In his ruling, the trial 
judge disregarded Dr. Cutler’s opinion regarding the impact the 
move would have on the children.  The judge found that Dr. 
Cutler’s report was inconsistent with the “customary and ethical 
practice” of custody evaluations and contrary to the couple’s 
divorce decree.157  John appealed. 
In an unpublished opinion, a three-judge Minnesota Court of 
Appeals’ panel reversed the trial judge.158  They found that John’s 
affidavits established a prima facie showing of endangerment.  A 
hearing where he could more fully present his evidence, including 
the testimony of Dr. Cutler regarding the impact relocation would 
have on the children, was ordered.159  The court found inter alia 
that the trial judge had improperly weighed Dr. Cutler’s report 
when it considered other outside contrary evidence.160 
Meredith petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court and asked 
that it review the Court of Appeals’ decision.161  Meredith’s petition 
for review was granted. 
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals.162  It held that 
the trial judge did not err in rejecting Dr. Cutler’s opinion, 
reasoning that the rejection was within the trial judge’s 
discretion.163  Further commenting on the report, the court stated 
that because it was produced without the knowledge or consent of 
Meredith, it was “arguably inconsistent with the provisions of the 
judgment and decree.”164  The court also said that while Dr. 
Cutler’s report portrayed strong and loving relationships between 
the Silbaugh children and John and his new wife, it failed to 
provide information about potential problems in Meredith’s 
 
   156.    Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d at 640. 
   157.    Id. 
 158. Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, No. CO-94-1739, 1994 WL 705384 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Dec. 20, 1994).  This opinion is designated as unpublished and may not be cited 
except as provided by Minn. St. Sec. 480A.08(3). 
   159.    Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d at 640. 
   160.    Id. at 640-41. 
   161.    Id. at 641. 
   162.    Id. at 642. 
 163. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d at 641 (relying on Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 
88 (Minn.1983)). 
 164. Id. 
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home.165  The court observed the report could not do this because 
Dr. Cutler did not have any contact with Meredith.166  The court 
suggested that Dr. Cutler’s report described the kind of stress and 
anxiety inherent for children in any move to a new locality and 
diminution of contact with one parent, which the court indicated is 
insufficient to trigger a change in custody.167 
The court said that any geographic change inevitably creates 
some anxiety for children, however, evidence of the disruption 
typically associated with such a move is not sufficient to overcome 
the Auge presumption that removal is in the best interests of the 
children.168  It noted that the “bare allegations” of alcohol abuse 
were not sufficient to establish “endangerment to the child’s 
physical or emotional health,”169 and concluded that the allegation 
that Meredith’s move was intended to interfere with John’s 
visitation rights was not supported by John’s affidavits.170 
Silbaugh and other decisions have cemented Minnesota’s 
liberal relocation standard into the everyday practice of family 
lawyers.  When the custodial parent seeks to move the child or 
children to a different state, visitation arrangements such as longer 
summer or holiday visits and regular telephone and mail contact 
are viewed as appropriate alternatives.171 
Shifting from the local to the national scene, the leading 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Cf. In re Marriage of Sheley, 895 P.2d 850, 856 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), 
overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 (Wash. 
1997); Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in 
a Mobile Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. LAW 791, 799 (1992). 
 168. Silbaugh, 542 N.W.2d at 642. 
 169. Id.; see also Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1988). 
 170. Silbaugh, 542 N.W.2d at 642. 
 171. See, e.g., Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (concluding extended summer visitation and other opportunities for 
visitation were reasonable and adequate ways to maintain parent-child 
relationship); Meyer v. Meyer, 346 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) 
(arranging alternative reasonable visitation schedule including regular telephone 
calls and extended summer and holiday visits).  In Auge v. Auge, the court 
observed: 
[T]he alternative of uninterrupted visits of a week or more in duration 
several times a year, where the [non-custodial parent] is in constant 
and exclusive parental contact with the children and has to plan and 
provide for them on a daily basis, may well serve the [parent-child] 
relationship better than the typical weekly visit which involves little if 
any exercise of real [parental] responsibility. 
334 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1983). 
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proponent of liberal relocation is Dr. Judith S. Wallerstein.172  Her 
influential studies have concluded that custody should not be 
changed unless it is necessary to protect the child.173  She has 
asserted that the cumulative body of social science research does 
not support the presumption that frequent and continuing access 
to both parents lies at the core of the child’s best interest.174 
Dr. Wallenstein argues the “centrality of the well-functioning 
custodial parent-child relationship as the protective factor during 
the post-divorce years.”175  She says that “when courts intervene in 
ways that disrupt the child’s relationship with the custodial parent, 
serious psychological harm may occur to the child as well as to the 
parent.”176  Courts and commentators have generally accepted the 
reliability of her research.177 
Recently, Dr. Wallenstein’s research has come under critical 
scrutiny.  In an article published in 2000, Dr. Richard A. Warshak 
states that “critical reading of over seventy-five studies in the social 
science literature, including Wallerstein’s earlier reports, generally 
supports a policy of encouraging both parents to remain in close 
 
 172. Judith S. Wallerstein, Ph.D., founded the Center for the Family in 
Transition in Marin County, California in 1980 and served as its executive director 
from 1980 until 1993.  She has researched and written extensively on the impact of 
divorce on children.  See, e.g., JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND 
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 297, 301 (1989); 
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN 
AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (setting forth Dr. Wallerstein’s theories); 
Joan Berlin Kelly & Judith S. Wallerstein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of 
the Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 20 (1976); Judith S. Wallerstein & 
Joan Berlin Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: The Adolescent Experience, in 3 THE 
CHILD IN HIS FAMILY: CHILDREN AT PSYCHIATRIC RISK 479 (1974); Judith S. 
Wallerstein & Joan Berlin Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child 
in Later Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 256 (1976); Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan 
Berlin Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Preschool Child, 14 J. AM. 
ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 600 (1975); Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long Term Effects of 
Divorce on Children: A Review, 30 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCH. 349 
(1991). 
 173. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 106, at 310, 318. 
 174. Id. at 311. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Calif. 1966).  Professor 
Judith S. Wallerstein submitted an amicus curiae brief to the California Supreme 
Court in this relocation case.  Id. at 483 n.11.  The amicus brief later appeared in 
slightly revised form under the title, “To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and 
Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce.”  
Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 106, at 310. 
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proximity to their children.”178  He contends that Professor 
Wallenstein has ignored the “broad consensus of professional 
opinion, based on a large body of evidence, that children normally 
develop close attachments to both parents, and that they do best 
when they have the opportunity to establish and maintain such 
attachments.”179  He claims that in earlier research, Dr. Wallerstein, 
recognized that the child’s need for continuity of emotional bonds 
meant the need for continuity of relations with both parents, and is 
puzzled because she now interprets “the same research results as 
supporting the view that courts should foster continuity in the 
child’s relationship with the mother but not with the father 
[where] the scientific literature does not justify it.”180  He also 
questions Dr. Wallerstein’s continued reliance on old research, 
conducted at a time when children saw relatively little of their 
fathers after divorce, where recent studies “document a change 
since the 1970s and early 1980s with greater involvement of 
divorced fathers with their children.”181 
Dr. Warshak asserts that Dr. Wallerstein has excluded from her 
research “many studies which repeatedly demonstrated a link 
between frequency of children’s contact with divorced fathers and 
children’s behavior, emotional health, satisfaction with custodial 
arrangements, and academic achievement.”182  He attacks Dr. 
Wallerstein’s assumption that the relocation will be rewarding for 
the relocating parent, suggesting that courts should consider the 
very real possibility that the relocation may not bring the 
anticipated benefits: 
The new relationship may fail.  Graduate school may not 
be what the parent expected.  The new job could be short-
lived.  Relationships with extended family can become 
strained.  And the children’s difficulties adjusting to the 
move and separation from their other parent might cast a 
 
 178. Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in Relocation 
Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83, 84 (2000). Dr. Warshak is a clinical, 
consulting, and research psychologist in private practice and Clinical Professor at 
the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, Texas. 
 179. Id. at 85, n.9 (citing RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION 
(1992); HENRY B. BILLER, FATHERS AND FAMILIES: PATERNAL FACTORS IN CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT (1993); THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (Michel E. 
Lamb ed., 1997)); see also  ROSS D. PARKE, FATHERS (1981) (for reviews of this 
literature). 
 180. Warshak, supra note 178, at 86. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 90. 
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pall on the parent’s satisfaction with the new 
circumstances.  In the event that the relocation 
disappoints the custodial parent, the children could 
experience the diminished parenting Wallerstein refers 
to, without the protective buffering effect of frequent 
contact with the non-custodial parent.183 
Other critics have attacked Dr. Wallerstein’s research as 
anecdotal, and without scientific sampling or rigorous “double-
blind” methodologies to ensure correction for any researcher 
bias.184  Moreover, they contend that her subjects are not necessarily 
typical because they come from predominantly white, upper 
middle class and are well educated, which raises questions about 
application of her findings to other groups.185 
It is apparent that the impact on a child’s development where 
the custodial parent is relocating is open to serious scientific 
disagreement.  Consequently, where a child has a close and loving 
relationship with both parents, courts should hesitate to 
automatically permit either parent to “win” the child because of an 
unsupported supposition in favor of either parent based on social 
science data.  The paramount consideration in a child custody 
decision is the child’s best interests, not those of the child’s 
parents.  Given the absence of reliable scientific support for either 
parent, Minnesota’s recent decision to encourage couples to 
develop a parenting plan that can mandate the use of the “best 
interests” test where relocation becomes an issue, is clearly a step in 
the right direction.186 
VI.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL—MINNESOTA’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
Historically, custodial parents could not relocate outside 
Minnesota with a minor child without the consent of the custodial 
parent or a court order.187  Courts feared that once the custodian 
was outside the state that they would lose jurisdiction to provide the 
 
 183. Id. at 99. 
 184. See http://www.divorceinfo.com/judithwallerstein.htm#Limitations (last 
visited August 31, 2001). 
 185. Id. 
 186. MINN. STAT. § 518.1705 (2000) (parenting plan can direct the best 
interest standard to govern relocation if both parties are represented by counsel or 
were fully informed, the agreement was voluntary and the parents were aware of its 
implications). 
 187. See, e.g., Eberhart v. Eberhart, 153 Minn. 66, 189 N.W. 592 (1922). 
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non-custodial parent with access to the child.  The question of the 
constitutionality of such a procedure was not discussed in the early 
decisions.188 
During the last quarter century, however, the constitutional 
issues surrounding relocation have been discussed in several 
articles189 and raised in various decisions.190  For example, in 
Jaramillo v. Jaramillo,191 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a 
state may not impose a burden on a relocating parent that 
unconstitutionally impairs the relocating parent’s right to travel.192  
The court observed, “[t]his right is so deeply ingrained in 
American law that it certainly needs no elaboration by the court.”193 
In Watt v. Watt,194 the Wyoming Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a trial judge’s modification of a divorce decree 
that changed custody due to the intrastate relocation of the 
custodial parent.195  At the time of the couple’s divorce, the trial 
court had imposed a restriction of an automatic change of custody 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Blair Hoffman, Note, Restrictions on a Parent’s Right to Travel in 
Child Custody Cases: Possible Constitutional Questions, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1973); 
Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. 
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 67 (1995-96); Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody and the Right to 
Travel: Legal and Psychological Implications, 24 J. FAM. L.  625 (1985-86); Tabitha 
Sample & Teresa Reiger, Relocation Standards and Constitutional Considerations, 10 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS 229 (1998); Edward Sivin, Note, Residence 
Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 
341 (1981); Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Post-Divorce Children: Relocation, 
the Constitution and the Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1985). 
 190. See, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418 (1981) (describing the right to 
travel as a privilege of national citizenship); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
629 (1969) (stating that although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the 
right to travel is a fundamental concept firmly established and repeatedly 
recognized), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Edwards 
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (recognizing fundamental right to travel 
using Commerce Clause); Staab v. Hurst, 868 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1994); Day v. Day, 711 So.2d 793 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 
481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 
1991) (finding a presumption against removal of the child by the custodial parent 
unconstitutionally impairs the custodial parent’s right to travel); Pitt v. Olds, 511 
S.E.2d 60 (S.C. 1999). 
 191. 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 305 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 (“[A]ll citizens [have the right 
to] be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by 
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this 
movement.”)). 
 194. 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999). 
 195. Id. at 616. 
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if the mother moved out of the area; a year after the divorce, she 
petitioned to relocate so she could pursue her education.196  The 
trial court found the automatic change of custody language 
improper; however, it awarded custody to the father based on the 
children’s best interests.197  The Wyoming Supreme Court stated 
that the trial court’s action amounted to impermissible 
infringement of the mother’s right to travel.198  It ruled that there is 
a fundamental right to intrastate travel protected by the 
unenumerated rights clause of the Wyoming Constitution.199 
Other courts have voiced concerns about orders imposing 
restrictions on the custodial parent without discussing their 
constitutional implications.  For example, the Iowa Court of 
Appeals in In Re Thielges,200 declared that “[w]e strongly disapprove . 
. . of custody provisions, whether stipulated by the parties or 
mandated by the court, that predetermine what future 
circumstances will warrant a future modification.”201 
Early Minnesota family law decisions reflected the 
jurisdictional concerns shared with the other state courts in the 
nation.  For example, in Eberhart v. Eberhart,202 when the custodial 
parent left Minnesota with the minor child, the non-custodial 
parent halted child support payments.  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that so long as the custodial parent remained outside 
Minnesota with the child, the non-custodial parent was relieved of 
any support obligation.  No constitutional question was raised or 
discussed. 
A quarter of a century ago, Minnesota indirectly addressed the 
constitutionality of relocation in Ryan v. Ryan.203  In that dispute, 
the custodial parent of a seven-year-old wanted to relocate to 
Ohio.204  She had accepted employment with the federal 
 
   196.    Id. at 610. 
   197.    Id. 
   198.    Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. 623 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).  In Thielges, the mother wanted to 
move with three children from Iowa to North Dakota, and the decree had 
provided that a move by either party from the children’s school district “shall 
constitute a substantial change in circumstances regarding modification of custody 
of the minor children.”  Id. at 234. 
 201. Id. at 237. 
 202. 153 Minn. 66, 189 N.W. 592 (1922). 
 203. 300 Minn. 244, 219 N.W.2d 912 (1974), reh’g denied July 26, 1974. 
   204.    Id. at 245, 219 N.W.2d at 914. 
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government, and began work with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs in Cincinnati.205  When her former husband 
rejected her relocation request, she sought judicial authorization. 
Following a hearing, her request to relocate was rejected along 
with her former husband’s motion to have custody transferred to 
him.206  In a memorandum accompanying the order, the trial judge 
stated that the custodian’s “true reason for accepting employment 
in Ohio was for personal self-fulfillment.”207  Given the financial 
circumstances of the parties and particularly those of plaintiff, the 
trial judge found no substantial improvement in the financial 
situation could be shown by the acceptance of the federal 
employment.208  However, the trial judge left custody with the 
custodian because of the child’s strong preference, apparently 
indicated to the court during in an in camera proceeding.209  The 
custodial parent appealed.210 
In her argument to the Minnesota Supreme Court in Ryan, the 
custodial parent asserted that Minnesota Statute § 518.175, which 
forbade relocation without permission of the non-custodial parent 
or the court, unconstitutionally infringed on her right to travel.211  
The court rejected her claim, reasoning that the decision to bar 
removal did not involve placing any sanctions against her.  The 
court said that the statute imposed no conditions for the court to 
consider and that the sanctions imposed by the trial judge were 
independent of the statute.  It reasoned that the sanction against 
 
   205.    Id. 
 206. Id. at 246, 219 N.W.2d at 914.  
 207. Id. at 246-247, 219 N.W.2d at 914. 
 208. Id. at 247, 219 N.W.2d at 914. 
 209. Trial courts were reminded that when considering motions for removal of 
a child outside the jurisdiction of the state or for support of children who have 
been removed outside the jurisdiction of the state, they must consider, in the 
exercise of their discretion, the legislative mandates included in MINN. STAT. § 
518.175, subds. 3-4, which provided as follows:  
Subd. 3.  The custodial parent shall not move the residence of the 
child to another state except upon order of the court or with the 
consent of the non-custodial parent, when the non-custodial parent 
has been given visitation rights by the decree.  Subd. 4.  Proof of an 
unwarranted denial of or interference with duly established visitation 
may constitute contempt of court and may be sufficient cause for 
reversal of custody. 
   210.    Ryan, 300 Minn. at 247, 219 N.W.2d at 914.  
 211. The custodial parent relied on Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969).  Ryan, 300 Minn. at 251-52, 219 N.W.2d at 917. 
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relocating was not brought into play by operation of the statute but 
by the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.  Therefore, the court 
found that no constitutional issue was before it. 
The constitutionality of relocation was more directly 
considered by Minnesota’s intermediate court of appeals in 
LaChapelle v. Mitten.212  The dispute was not, however, one involving 
a custodial parent seeking to relocate in a post-divorce dispute.  
Rather it involved the biological mother of the child, the mother’s 
former lesbian lover, and the male whose sperm had been used to 
inseminate the biological mother.213 
The biological mother, Denise Mitten, gave birth to a child as 
a result of artificial insemination from sperm donated by Mark 
LaChapelle.214  Mitten and her partner, Valerie Ohanian, had 
agreed with LaChapelle and his partner as to custody and visitation 
of the child.215  When Mitten and Ohanian severed LaChapelle’s 
visitation with the child, LaChapelle began  paternity 
proceedings.216  Later, when Mitten and Ohanian terminated their 
relationship, the parties commenced various proceedings to 
determine custody and visitation rights.217  By this time, Mitten and 
the minor child had moved to Michigan.218 
After an extended hearing, the trial judge granted Mitten sole 
physical custody on the condition that she and the child leave 
Michigan and take up residence in Minnesota.219 
Mitten appealed alleging that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in conditioning sole physical custody on her return to 
Minnesota.220  She claimed the order violated her constitutional 
rights of travel, privacy and equal protection.221 
A three-judge court of appeals panel held that conditioning 
sole physical custody on Mitten returning with the infant to 
Minnesota from Michigan did not violate her constitutional right of 
travel, because the move was in the child’s best interests.222  The 
 
 212. 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev. denied May 16, 2000. 
 213. Id. at 157. 
   214.    Id. at 157. 
   215.    Id. 
   216.    Id. 
   217.    Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 158. 
   220.    Id. at 157. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 163. 
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panel reasoned that once the child was returned to Minnesota, it 
could maintain a relationship with all of the parties who had played 
a role in its life: the custodial parent (her biological mother), her 
mother’s former lesbian partner as her “emotional parent,” and the 
sperm donor, her biological father.223 
The court of appeals conceded that conditioning sole physical 
custody on the custodian’s return to Minnesota raised fundamental 
questions regarding her right to travel, privacy, and equal 
protection under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions.224  
It also agreed that the right to travel is inherent in the concept of 
our country as a federal union and a fundamental constitutional 
right under the federal constitution.225  It recognized that the 
nature of the disadvantage or hardship involved was important to 
the level of review of any restriction on the right to travel.226  In this 
dispute, the hardship imposed on the custodial parent was 
characterized as the loss of sole physical custody of her daughter if 
she failed to return to Minnesota.227 
The court of appeals also recognized that requiring the 
custodian’s return to Minnesota implicates the fundamental right 
to raise one’s child, and it applied the strict scrutiny standard of 
review.228  The strict scrutiny test could be met only by a showing of 
a compelling state interest, which it said were the best interests of 
the minor child.229 
In its analysis, the court relied in part on a recent ruling from 
the Montana Supreme Court, In re Custody of D.M.G.230  This dispute 
involved an unmarried couple that had lived together and had had 
two children.231  Two years following the birth of the children, the 
relationship broke down, and the mother moved to Oregon with 
the children.232  The biological father challenged the relocation 
and the trial judge awarded the parties joint custody and provided 
that the mother would have primary physical custody once she 
 
 223. Id. at 164. 
 224. See id. at 163. 
   225.    Id. at 163. 
   226.    Id. 
 227. Id. 
   228.    Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. 951 P.2d 1377 (Mont. 1998). 
 231. Id. at 1379. 
   232.    Id. 
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returned to Montana.233  If she did not relocate, custody of the 
children would be rotated every two years.234 
The Montana Supreme Court held that the trial judge abused 
his discretion by effectively requiring the mother to relocate or lose 
custody in the absence of sufficient proof of a compelling nature to 
interfere with her constitutional right to travel.235  However, it 
asserted that the mother’s constitutional right of interstate travel is 
qualified by the special obligations of custody, the state’s interest in 
protecting the best interests of the children, and by the competing 
interests of the non-custodial parent.236  The Montana court also 
held that furtherance of the best interests of children may 
constitute a compelling state interest worthy of reasonable 
interference with a parent’s right to travel, but the parent 
requesting the travel restriction must provide sufficient proof that a 
restriction is in the best interests of the child, although in this case, 
the father had not done so.237 
In LaChapelle, the Minnesota Court of Appeals observed that 
the trial judge did not restrict the custodian parent’s right to 
remain in Michigan; the judge only required that the minor child 
to be returned to Minnesota.238  It reasoned that any burden placed 
on the custodial parent’s right to travel arose from her desire to 
remain the minor child’s sole physical custodian.239 
The court also agreed that parents enjoy a general freedom 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1380. 
 235. Id.  The court also held that the trial judge should have applied the 
statutory presumption that custody should be awarded to primary care giver, who 
was the custodial mother.  Id. 
 236. Id. at 1383. 
 237. Id.  See also Ziegler v. Ziegler, 691 P.2d 773, 780 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) 
(citing with approval the district court decision) (“Providing and assuring the 
maximum opportunities for parental love, guidance, support and companionship 
is a compelling state interest that . . . warrants reasonable interference with the 
constitutional right of travel.”); Clark v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1986) (holding grant of custody to mother on condition she return to Indiana 
does not impose burden on right to travel, because (1) she remains free to go 
where she chooses; (2) it is only the children who must be returned to Indiana; 
and (3) the law has few objectives more compelling than protecting the interests 
of children); Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (“[The 
custodial parent’s] right to travel or even to establish residence elsewhere is 
limited only by her desire to retain her status as the custodial parent.”). 
 238. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev. 
denied May 16, 2000. 
 239. Id. 
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from governmental intrusion in child-rearing decisions240 and, 
although not absolute, a constitutional right to familial privacy.  
Where there is an allegation of interference by the state with a 
protected right of privacy, the court balances the interest in the 
privacy against the state’s need to intrude on that privacy.  Here, 
Minnesota’s interest in protecting the child’s best interests were 
considered sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion into the 
custodial parent’s privacy in her familial relationship with the 
minor child.241 
Mitten had also argued that the order requiring her to return 
to Minnesota unfairly obligated her to move to a place she does not 
want to live for the convenience of the child’s father and one other 
important adult in the child’s life.242  Such an order, she contended, 
offends the equal protection clauses of the Minnesota and United 
States Constitutions.243  The court of appeals also rejected this 
argument.  It reasoned that the order did not require the custodial 
parent to move her home at all; it simply required that the minor 
child be brought back to Minnesota because this was in the child’s 
best interests.244 
LaChapelle did not, of course, involve relocation following 
divorce or application of the Auge v. Auge presumption.  However, 
the constitutional issues raised in LaChapelle would certainly appear 
to implicate post-divorce relocation requests.  It would be 
somewhat unusual if there were two relocation standards: one for 
divorced custodial parents and another for custodians of children 
born out of wedlock. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the last quarter century, society in Minnesota has changed 
 
 240. Id. (citing In re Santoro, 578 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d 
on other grounds, 594 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 1999); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923)). 
 241. Id. 
   242.    Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 164-65 (citing Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836-37 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1983) as a rejection of the mother’s argument that a residency restriction in 
the custody decree violated equal protection because a similar restriction was not 
placed on the father, because the best-interests-of-the-child standard applies to 
both parents). 
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significantly.245  It is increasingly mobile, home to large numbers of 
dual-career couples with hundreds of day care centers caring for 
thousands of children.  Women are attracted to work outside the 
home in growing numbers and are gaining unprecedented 
prominence within business and within the legal and medical 
professions.  Increasingly, fathers are taking a more active role in 
their children’s lives.  Past assumptions regarding the role of men 
and women play in raising children may no longer be viable. 
Courts, legislatures, and experts, struggling with the question 
of relocation following divorce, have not reached a consensus on 
the consequences of relocation on a child’s future development.  
All agree that a relocation decision must be in a child’s best 
interests; however, they disagree over the outcome of a relocation 
dispute. 
Jurisdictions outside Minnesota vary on whether to begin a 
relocation request with a presumption favoring the custodial or 
non-custodial parent.  Proponents favoring the custodial parent 
contend that a custodial parent presumption, similar to that used 
in Minnesota, is in the child’s best interests.  Those favoring the 
non-custodial parent contend that maintaining the status quo, 
absent a showing of compelling circumstances, is in the child’s best 
interests. 
Everyone recognizes that there is no easy answer to the 
question of allowing relocation when a custodial parent is offered a 
better-paying, career-enhancing job in a new location and the non-
custodial parent, who has actively participated in a child’s life, 
refuses to surrender overnight visits, regular weekend visits, 
dropping by the child’s soccer game and attending parent-teacher 
conferences. 
Relocation law in Minnesota has become somewhat confusing.  
Some of the confusion exists because the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has indicated it will not enforce stipulations between parents 
regarding the appropriate standard to apply when relocation is 
request.246  However, this ruling appears to have been overruled by 
the new Parenting Plan legislation that makes it clear that a couple 
can agree on the legal standard to apply where relocation becomes 
 
 245. See Theresa A. Peterson, Note, The State of Child Custody in Minnesota: Why 
Minnesota Should Enact the Parenting Plan Legislation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1577, 
1580-81 (1999). 
 246. Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 1999). 
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an issue in the future.247 
The LaChapelle decision, although decided by Minnesota’s 
intermediate appellate court, raises troubling constitutional 
questions about current practice under Minn. Stat. § 
518.18(d)(iv).248 
 
 247. Minnesota Statutes provide the following: 
Subd. 7.  Moving the Child to Another State. Parents may agree, but 
the court must not require, that in a parenting plan the factors in 
section 518.17 or 257.025, as applicable, will govern a decision 
concerning removal of a child’s residence from this state, provided 
that: 
(1) both parents were represented by counsel when the parenting plan 
was approved; or 
(2) the court found the parents were fully informed, the agreement 
was voluntary, and the parents were aware of its implications. 
Subd. 8.  Allocation of Certain Expenses. (a) Parents creating a 
parenting plan are subject to the requirements of the child support 
guidelines under section 518.551. 
(b) Parents may include in the parenting plan an allocation of 
expenses for the child.  The allocation is an enforceable contract 
between the parents. 
Subd. 9.  Modification of Parenting Plans. (a) Parents may modify the 
schedule of the time each parent spends with the child or the decision-
making provisions of a parenting plan by agreement.  To be 
enforceable, modifications must be confirmed by court order.  A 
motion to modify decision-making provisions or the time each parent 
spends with the child may be made only within the time limits provided 
by section 518.18. 
(b) The parties may agree, but the court must not require them, to 
apply the best interests standard in section 518.17 or 257.025, as 
applicable, for deciding a motion for modification that would change 
the child’s primary residence, provided that: 
(1) both parties were represented by counsel when the parenting plan 
was approved; or 
(2) the court found the parties were fully informed, the agreement was 
voluntary, and the parties were aware of its implications. 
(c) If the parties do not agree to apply the best interests standard, 
section 518.18, paragraph (d), applies. 
MINN. STAT. § 518.1705, subds. 7, 8, 9 (2000).  One of the most significant changes 
in the last couple of years is the increase in the number of states that require a 
parent who seeks custody to file a “parenting plan.”  See, e.g., Robert L. Gottsfield, 
Relocating Andy: Remaining with the Nurturer as Guiding Principle; Impact of Relocation 
Statute; How to Win a Removal Case, 36 ARIZ. ATT’Y 10, 11 (Jan. 2000) (discussing 
Arizona’s Parenting Plan). 
    248.    Minnesota Statutes § 518.18(d)(iv) provides that custody will not be 
modified unless: “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical 
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It would appear that the time is ripe for the Minnesota 
Legislature to revisit the entire issue of relocation and to the extent 
possible, neutralize the current state of the law.  A separate neutral 
statute would make all relocation decisions consistent with the 
Parenting Plan legislation promulgated in 2000.  It would remove 
political influence to the extent possible and best protect the 
interests of children. 
There are, of course, many relocation models to examine.  
New York’s de novo approach,  Maryland’s neutral effort, and drafts 
of Model Acts may all be helpful.249  It is time for a new and up-to-
date legislative evaluation of post-divorce relocation.  Minnesota’s 
children deserve no less. 
 
 
or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development and the harm 
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of 
a change to the child.”  MINN. STAT. §518.18(d)(iv) (2000). 
 249. Janet Leach Richards, Children’s Rights v. Parents’ Rights: A Proposed Solution 
to the Custodial Relocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L. REV. 245, 277 n.176 (1999) (citing 
the Proposed Model Relocation Act (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 
(1997)), copies of which are available from the AAML office: American Academy 
of Matrimonial Lawyers, 150 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 2040, Chicago, Illinois 
60601, phone: 312-263-6477). 
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